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DEMOCRACY AND DISGUST: REFLECTIONS
ON PUBLIC CHOICE
DANIEL A. FARBER*
Opinion polls reveal an increasingly cynical public attitude toward
American government.' Some recent judicial opinions also reflect a jaun-
diced view of politics in general and legislatures in particular. 2 A similar
attitude toward legislatures has also emerged in recent legal scholarship.
3
This attitude finds some basis in the body of scholarship known as public
choice theory, which seeks to use economic methodology to analyze poli-
tics. At least on initial acquaintance with the literature, the reader is
likely to come away with a feeling of despair about the political process.
Sometimes the legislature is portrayed as the playground of special inter-
ests, sometimes as the passive mirror of self-interested voters, sometimes
as a slot machine whose outcomes are entirely unpredictable. These
images are hardly calculated to evoke respect.
4
In his astute review of the debate over public choice theory, Profes-
sor Jerry Mashaw is skeptical of this bleak vision of politics. Although
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Bill Eskridge, Phil Frickey,
Jerry Mashaw, and Suzanna Sherry made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this comment.
I. See Mitchell & Scott, Leadership Failures, the Distrusting Public, and Prospects of the Ad-
ministrative State, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 445, 445-46 (1987). See also W. NEUMAN, THE PARADOX
OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 11-29 (1986).
2. See Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 123, 136-38 (1988) (Professor Mashaw's article appears in this symposium issue).
Distrust of the legislative process is particularly clear in some recent judicial discussions of legislative
history. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 946-47 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Hirschey
v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
3. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law.- A Reply to DeBow
and Lee, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1014-15 (1988); Mashaw, supra note 2, at 604 nn.12, 15-16. For a
particularly clear expression of this attitude toward politics, see Wagner, Morals, Interests, and Can-
stitutional Order: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 OR. L. REV. 73, 76-82 (1988) (discussing govern-
ment as "an instrument of predation," id. at 80).
4. When I say that this image is conveyed by some of the public choice literature, I do not
mean that any one writer explicitly endorses all aspects of this view of politics. Any given public
choice theorist would undoubtedly introduce qualifications and exceptions to this description of poli-
tics. Rather, this view is the common core of much of the writing on public choice as it existed, say,
about ten years ago. The scholar who comes closest to adopting this view outright is Judge Frank
Easterbrook. He has argued, for example, that because the Supreme Court relies on majority voting,
the Court's opinion will necessarily be incoherent, Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95
HARV. L. REV. 802, 811-32 (1982); that legislative outcomes are likely to be either incoherent or the
result of arbitrary agendas, Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533. 547-48 (1983)
(hereinafter Easterbrook. Statutes' Domains]; and that much legislation purporting to reflect the
public interest is in fact the product of special interest groups, Easterbrook, Foreword. The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-18 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook. Foreword].
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he seems to lean toward rejecting this vision, he concludes that it is too
early to be sure about its validity. 5 If this vision does prove to be at least
partially valid, he argues persuasively, its implications for the legal sys-
tem remain unclear.
6
Even if highly pessimistic findings about the political process do not
lead directly to new legal doctrines, however, accepting these findings
could not help but affect the judicial function. Knowing that legislative
actions are generally either self-serving or random might not convey a
new intellectual direction to public law, but this knowledge would be
bound to have a profoundly dispiriting effect. How could a judge be ex-
pected to take seriously the job of interpreting legislation while believing
that the legislature is morally bankrupt? If we come to accept this nihil-
istic vision of politics, judges might still go through the motions of defer-
ence to legislatures, but only in a demoralized way. The threat, then, is
not so much that judges will change existing legal doctrines but that they
may lose heart, leaving American public law an empty shell.
Public choice theory is far from mature. The application of eco-
nomic methods to political questions already has proved fruitful. We can
expect further insights from this approach, but it is too early to say much
about the final form that public choice theory is likely to take. It is prob-
ably even more premature to attempt to draw firm conclusions about
how public law should respond to the findings of public choice theory.
But it is not too early, in my view, to reject the profoundly pessimistic
implications of the early public choice theories.
I will begin by considering the role of self-interest (particularly spe-
cial interest groups) in the political process. I find little to quarrel with
in Professor Mashaw's perceptive review of the relevant scholarly litera-
ture. I am also grateful to him for clearing up some ambiguities in my
own earlier writings with Phil Frickey on the subject.7 To the extent we
disagree at all, it is only about matters of emphasis: I am somewhat more
confident than Professor Mashaw appears to be that ideology as well as
self-interest plays a role in politics.
I will then turn to the other major branch of public choice theory,
which Mashaw treats only in passing. This branch, which grows out of
Kenneth Arrow's pioneering work, is often thought to have dire implica-
5. See Mashaw, supra note 2, at 125, 150.
6. Id. at 127. i agree with his view, see id. at 160, that practical reason will be an important
part of the answer to the problem of applying public choice theory to legal problems.
7. Id. at 142, 143, 147-48.
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tions for democratic legitimacy. 8 I will suggest, however, that recent
work in the field is not only compatible with respect for democratic insti-
tutions, but may also give us better insights into the normative basis of
democracy.
The "folk" political science of our time might be called vulgar plu-
ralism. Vulgar pluralism views the political process as an arena of pure
greed, in which self-interested voters, self-aggrandizing politicians, and
self-seeking interest groups meet to do business. Much of the early pub-
lic choice literature embraced this viewpoint. Recent scholarship, how-
ever, gives us good grounds for rejecting vulgar pluralism. To view
politics as wholly deliberative would be quixotic, but there is - perhaps
surprisingly - solid evidence that voters and politicians are actually mo-
tivated in part by factors other than greed. There is also some reason to
believe that pluralism underestimates the active role played by legisla-
tures in reworking preferences into political outcomes.
To the extent that recent advocates of republicanism have rejected
vulgar pluralism, the public choice literature supports them. Like Pro-
fessor Mashaw, 9 I am skeptical of the more utopian strands in neo-repub-
lican thought. A careful reading of the public choice literature, however,
does support a more modest, perhaps Madisonian, 10 version of republi-
canism, in which concern about the public interest and legislative deliber-
ation play a role in politics.
I. DOES IDEOLOGY MATTER?
Whatever else may determine the behavior of legislators, a desire to
be reelected must surely be one factor. If we are to understand legisla-
tors, then, we must understand the electoral process, and in particular,
the behavior of voters. Public choice theory seems to have little to tell us
about popular voting. Since any individual's vote is virtually certain to
have no impact on election results, and since voting imposes some costs
in terms of time and effort, a rational, self-interested person would not
vote at all.II If such a person did find herself in the voting booth, she
8. For an introductory discussion, see Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice,
74 VA. L. Riv. 423, 425-37 (1988).
9. Mashaw. supra note 2, at 129-31, 139-41.
10. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-48 (1985)
(sketching a synthesis of pluralism and republicanism, which the author calls "deliberative democ-
racy" and attributes to Madison).
II. Voter turnout can affect election results. See, e.g., Tucker & Vedlitz. Does Heavy Turnout
Help Democrats in Presidential Elections?, 80 AM. Poi.. Sci. REv. 1291 (1986). Hence. a theory
which seeks to explain legislators' behavior must also account for the decision to vote.
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would have no reason to vote in any particular way.' 2 If the policy es-
poused by one of the candidates would be in her self-interest, she might
vote for that person, but she would have little reason to do so, since for
all practical purposes there is no causal link between her individual vote
and that candidate's election. On the other hand, since something other
than self-interest evidently motivated her to drive to the polls, that same
motivation might quite plausibly continue to influence her in her choice
of candidate.
As Professor Mashaw explains, some empirical studies in the 1970s
suggested that voters are influenced by the general health of the economy
but not by their individual economic interests. 13 As he notes, however,
these studies were subjected to devastating methodological criticism in
an article by Gerry Kramer. 14 Besides discrediting these earlier studies,
Kramer's article has also stimulated further research. A recent study by
Gregory Markus, designed specifically to avoid Kramer's methodological
criticisms, concluded that voters are motivated both by their own indi-
vidual economic circumstances and by the overall health of the economy.
Elections, however, are much more strongly affected by the second fac-
tor. The explanation is as follows. Suppose that individual voters are
equally influenced by the general unemployment rate and by whether
they themselves are unemployed. If the unemployment rate rises by five
percent, all voters will be less likely to vote for the incumbent. On the
other hand, only the additional five percent of the unemployed will be
influenced by the change in their individual circumstances. Given two
factors, one of which affects the average voter and one that affects only a
small minority, the first factor will have the larger effect on outcomes (all
other things being equal).' 5 Consequently, Markus found, voters' per-
ceptions of their own economic welfare had much less effect on election
outcomes than changes in the nation's economic prosperity. Each one
percent change in the nation's per capita disposable income translated
into a 2.3 percent change in the vote for the incumbent.' 6 Although
12. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 3, at 1016-18; Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 893-94 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence].
13. Mashaw, supra note 2, at 150.
14. Kramer, The Ecological Fallacy Revisited. Aggregate versus Individual-level Findings on
Economics and Elections. and Sociotropic Voting, 77 AM. Pot-. ScI. REV. 92 (1983).
15. Markus, The Inpact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential
Vote: A Pooled Cross-SectionalAnalvsis, 32 AM. J. Pot. Sc. 137 (1988). Among other methodologi-
cal responses to Kramer's criticism, Markus used cross-sectional "microdata" based on surveys
rather than relying on aggregate voting data, pooled data from different time periods, and revali-
dated the items used to measure changes in individual financial circumstances.
16. Id. at 151. Markus found that this model predicted almost precisely the 1984 vote for
Reagan. Id. at 152.
[Vol. 65:161
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Markus's study is undoubtedly not the final word on the subject, his find-
ings seem plausible.
With regard to legislators themselves, the best of the recent empiri-
cal literature also concludes that personal ideology influences roll call
votes. As Mashaw points out, these studies - like any other social sci-
ence research - are neither methodologically perfect nor wholly conclu-
sive.' 7 These studies are, however, the best information we have, and
should not be lightly dismissed.
Moreover, the results of these studies are confirmed by two other
important kinds of evidence. First, the political science literature on leg-
islative behavior supports the conclusion that legislators are partly influ-
enced by a desire to promote the public interest. 18 While economists
sometimes seem to trust only the results of econometric studies, as legal
scholars we need not be so parochial in our methodological assessments.
Indeed, the fact that traditional political scientists have reached the same
conclusions as the best econometric research is a particularly valuable
confirmation precisely because the research methodologies are so
different.
Second, detailed investigations of the adoption of particular statutes
tend not to support explanations based solely on special interest influ-
ence. For example, it has been suggested that environmental statutes are
designed to favor large firms over small ones. 19 In reality, the major in-
fluence on the legislation seems to have been a desire to appeal to en-
vironmentalist voters. 20 Similarly, the Glass-Steagall Act has been
described by a prominent public choice analyst as the result of lobbying
by New York investment bankers. 2' A recent study, however, demon-
strates that the statute is precisely what it appeared to be all along: the
product of misguided populist impulses.
22
Thus, we have three bodies of evidence that seem to point to the
same conclusion: the most careful econometric work, the findings of
traditional social scientists, and historical investigations of the public
17. Mashaw, supra note 2, at 145-48.
18. For a summary of the political science literature, see Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence,
supra note 12, at 886-90.
19. Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 4, at 16 n.16; Pashigan. The Effect of Environmental
Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1984).
20. Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization
of Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985). Notably, the authors of this study con-
cluded that these voters were not represented by organized interest groups at the time. Id. at 317.
21. Macey, Special Interest Groups' Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of
Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 20 (1984).
22. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the
Courts in Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 694-98 (1987).
1989]
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choice accounts of particular legislation. There is no such thing as con-
clusive evidence in the social sciences, but we can feel some degree of
confidence in rejecting the vulgar pluralist varieties of public choice.
Only a fool would deny the importance of self-interest in the political
process, but we can also be reasonably sure that self-interest is not the
whole story.
II. ARE LEGISLATURES CHAOTIC?
If interest group theory suggests the possibility that legislation is
likely to be malign, another branch of public choice theory suggests the
equally unpleasant possibility that legislation is random and arbitrary.
Building on Kenneth Arrow's pioneering work, theorists have shown
that voting cycles are likely in majority voting schemes and may often be
universal. That is, given any two proposals A and B, there is some se-
quence of votes which would lead the majority to reject A in favor of
other proposals, and then reject those other proposals in favor of B, even
if in a direct contest A would beat B. 23 Professor Mashaw aptly summa-
rizes the implications of this phenomenon:
The most basic finding of the Arrovian branch of public choice theory
might be characterized as indicating that collective action must be
either objectionable or uninterpretable. A stable relationship between
the preferences of individuals and the outcomes of collective choice
processes can be obtained only by restrictions on decision processes
that most people would find objectionable. At its most extreme, Ar-
rovian public choice predicts that literally anything can happen when
votes are taken. At its most cynical, it reveals that, through agenda
manipulation and strategic voting, majoritarian processes can be trans-
formed into the equivalent of dictatorship. In a more agnostic mode, it
merely suggests that the outcomes of collective decisions are probably
meaningless because it is impossible to be certain that they are not
simply an artifact of the decision process that has been used.
24
Professor Mashaw is not alone in seeing these negative implications
of social choice theory. Because voting is so susceptible to cycling and
strategic behavior, Professor William Riker argues, "the meaning of so-
cial choices is quite obscure;" they may reflect the voters' true values,
successful strategic behavior, or the "accidental amalgam of what the
manipulators (perhaps unintentionally) happened to produce. '2 5 Profes-
23. The proof is sketched in P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 71-82
(1986). For an explanation of Arrow's Theorem and its implications, see id. at 57-65.
24. Mashaw, supra note 2, at 126-27.
25. W. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THE-
ORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAl CHOICE 167 (1982). For a critique of Riker,
see J. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 290-310 (1988). Recently, Riker has argued
that these pervasive defects in majority rule justify a decrease in judicial deference to legislative
[Vol. 65:161
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sor Riker's view of the meaninglessness of legislative outcomes has been
echoed by Judge Frank Easterbrook. On the basis of public choice the-
ory, he concludes:
Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have "in-
tents" or "designs," hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or
may not have a design. The body as a whole, however, has only out-
comes. It is ... impossible to reason from one or more sections of a
statute to a problem not resolved.
2 6
Whether legislatures are chaotic or driven by internal structures like
agenda rules, the normative implications are troubling. Majoritarianism
rests on the assumption that legislation is linked to majority views, but
public choice theory seems to deny any such causal connection: out-
comes are either random or driven by legislative features such as agenda
rules, but in any event majority preferences do not translate into a mean-
ingful collective choice.
One way of escaping this dilemma is to postulate that preferences
are created by political decisions, rather than vice versa, so that individu-
als ultimately come to hold identical preferences as members of the same
political community. I agree with Professor Mashaw that this version of
the republican vision is unrealistic if not unpalatable. 27 We must take as
given, then, that society is composed of individuals with diverse prefer-
ences, and from that perspective inquire into the possibilities of demo-
cratic choice.
One interpretation of these public choice results is that legislatures
are much like slot machines: since majority rule produces complete cy-
cling, the legislative outcomes are unpredictable if not wholly fortuitous.
These predictions of legislative chaos do not, fortunately, have much em-
pirical support. As one scholar observed, "the theoretical results
achieved by the formal analysis of legislative choice are markedly incon-
sistent with our empirical knowledge of legislatures such as the U.S.
Congress."' 28 How can we explain this gap between theory and fact?
decisions. See Riker & Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice. The Political Con-
sequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373 (1988).
26. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 4, at 547-48.
27. Mashaw, supra note 2, at 140.
28. Panning, Formal Models of Legislative Processes, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RE-
SEARCH 669 (G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson & M. Jewell eds. 1985). He explains:
As formal theorists themselves have increasingly recognized, social choice theory as it
pertains to legislative voting is unsatisfactory in ways that are not easily dismissed. The
immediate focus of dissatisfaction is the radical inconsistency between what the theory
implies and what is in fact observed. Extant theory implies that stable outcomes typically
do not exist, that the outcomes which do occur are inherently unpredictable. and that
consistent policy choices by legislatures are not to be expected due to the prevalence of
cyclical majorities. Schofield (1980), for example, concludes from his survey of social
choice theory that political processes are fundamentally chaotic and unpredictable, that
1989]
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To begin with, majority voting is not always prone to incoherence, 29
most notably so when the members of the group have "uni-peaked pref-
erences." This might occur if each legislator ranked outcomes on a lib-
eral-to-conservative scale, and differed only in her preferred location on
the scale.30 The likelihood that a group has sufficiently well-behaved
preferences to guarantee coherent results is greater in a small group such
as a legislative committee. Nevertheless, a representative's position on a
unidimensional, ideological spectrum may also be a determining factor in
some floor votes, thereby preventing any possible voting cycle.
Another method of preventing cycling is to impose structural re-
strictions such as agenda rules. One important focus of public choice the-
ory concerns agenda setting and decisional structures such as
committees. 3' Legislatures apparently use these devices to ameliorate the
problem of cycling majorities. 32 As a result, even when majority rule
itself does not suffice to produce coherence, legislatures may possess
"structure-induced equilibrium. ' 33
almost anything can happen. But these theoretical expectations are clearly at odds with
what we know empirically about most legislatures (Tullock, 1981). Unless the observed
stability of legislative processes is simply dismissed as illusory, this inconsistency between
theory and observation poses awkward problems for formal theorists. How this inconsis-
tency can be remedied is consequently a principal question on the research agenda now
emerging in formal theory.
Id. at 680-81. See also Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5,
10-11 (1985) ("neither interpretation" of the chaos theorem-that either there must be a dictatorial
agenda setter or legislative outcomes must "wander anywhere"-"rings true in any real-world legis-
lative context").
29. For summaries of the various methods of evading Arrow's result, see Farber, From Plastic
Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337; Sen, Social Choice and Justice. A Review
Article, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1764, 1770-74 (1985).
30. See K. ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: SOCIAL CHOICE AND JUS-
TICE 78-87 (1983); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 166-72 (1970).
31. For an overview of the literature, see Panning, supra note 28, at 676-78, 681-82. Agenda
control and legislative decisional structure can also influence outcomes even when cycling majorities
are not present, for example, by keeping popular alternatives entirely off the voting agenda. See
generally Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 564 (1977)
("[A]genda or groupings in which alternatives are considered for adoption or elimination can be a
major parameter in determining what a group will ultimately choose."). For some experimental
confirmation of this hypothesis, see Wilson, Forward and Backward Agenda Procedures.- Committee
Experiments on Structurally Induced Equilibrium, 48 J. Poi.. 390 (1986).
32. These devices and norms have other consequences as well, such as their tendency to in-
crease legislative bias in favor of the status quo. For a discussion of how the Article I structure of
decisionmaking prevents cycling and favors the status quo, see Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective
Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article L and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Admnistrative Agen-
cies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 954-58.
33. See Shepsle & Weingast, Structure-Iduced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB.
CHOICE 503-19 (1981); see also Shepsle & Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Out-
comes with ImnplicationsforAgenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. Sci. 49, 69 (1984) [hereinafter Shep-
sle & Weingast, Uncovered Sets] (concluding that "only in the simplest of institutions ... does the
cyclicity of the majority-rule preference relation directly characterize outcomes."); Shepsle & Wein-
gast, When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?, 46 J. POl. 206, 208 (1984) (considering the effect of
institutional practices on majority coalitions).
[Vol. 65:161
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These institutional features of legislatures promote stability and co-
herence, but other mechanisms also seem to restrain instability. Voting
experiments have shown that voting outcomes can be fairly predictable
and clustered even when the voters' preferences contain massive cycles.
Theoretically, the results of majority voting should wander over all possi-
ble outcomes, but voting actually has a strong tendency to favor balanced
compromise outcomes.
34
These empirical results are paralleled by more sophisticated formal
models, in which voting outcomes remain stable and predictable even
when the group's preferences are saturated with cycles.35 These models
involve a wide range of assumptions and use a variety of mathematical
tools to describe the focal area of legislative outcomes. 36 The models also
limit voting outcomes to relatively small subsets of all those possible.
Even in the presence of massive cycling possibilities, they predict stability
of a kind missing from earlier models.
37
One source of stability consists of behavioral norms such as fair-
ness. 38 Consider a very simple voting situation 39 in which three people
34. See Ferejohn, Fiorina & Weisberg, Toward a Theory of Legislative Decision, in GAME THE-
ORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 165, 170-73 (P. Ordeshook ed. 1978); Fiorina & Plott, Committee
Decisions Under Majority Rule. An Experimental Study, 72 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 575, 590 (1978).
On the other hand, even where there is a single alternative that dominates all others, it is not always
chosen. See Hoffman & Packel, A Stochastic Model of Committee Voting with Exogenous Costs.
Theory and Experiments, 27 BEHAV. SCi. 43, 44-45 (1982) (note, by the way, how some of the
participants cleverly evaded the experimental design to gather information and find a "mutually
acceptable" solution, id. at 52-53).
35. See Ferejohn, McKelvey & Packel, Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Vot-
ing Models, 1 SOC. CHOICE 45 (1984); Grofman, Owen, Noviello & Glazer, Stability and Centrality
of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 539 (1987) [hereinafter
Grofman]; Miller, A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting. Further Graph- Theo-
retical Approaches to the Theory of Voting, 24 AM. J. POL. ScI. 68 (1980).
36. See Ferejohn, McKelvey & Packel, supra note 35, at 59; McKelvey, Covering, Dominance.
and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice, 30 AM. J. POL. Sci. 283, 297 (1986); Shepsle &
Weingast, Uncovered Sets, supra note 33, at 69-71 (exploring the effects of different agenda formation
rules).
37. For a general description of these results, see Panning, supra note 28, at 681.
38. Indeed, one common problem in designing voting experiments is the risk that participants
will vote for "fair" rather than individually rational outcomes. See Fiorina & Plott, supra note 34. at
583 (describing pilot experiments); Wilson, Results on the Condorcet Winner: A Committee Experi-
ment on Time Constraints, 17 SIMULATION & GAMES 217, 222-25 (1986). Interestingly enough,
economics graduate students are the one group of experimental subjects who appear immune to
fairness claims. See Donohue, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 LAW & Soc. REV.
903, 912 n.19 (1988).
39. This simple model captures the essence of the "chaos" results on majority voting:
One common interpretation of those results is that institutions that use majority rule ought
not to work: since choices are cyclical, losers should always be able to find some alternative
they like better that could defeat the present status quo, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, all
legislatures should be in constant turmoil as losers try to reverse decisions they do not like.
Grofman, supra note 35, at 539. The cake game in the text has the same attribute, inasmuch as a
loser can always propose a new split that will win a majority over the status quo. whatever the status
quo might be.
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must vote over how to divide a cake between them. 40 Assuming that
they seek to maximize their own gains in this distributive situation, no
equilibrium outcome exists. Any proposal can always be upset by an-
other proposal preferred by two of the players, so this process has no
ending point.41 Yet there is a natural way to cut the cake; an equal three-
way split (technically, the "value solution" of the game).42 Besides its
equitable appeal, this solution has a sort of stability. It is true that any-
one could offer an amendment that would beat this outcome, but this
would accomplish nothing except to start another round of endless
cycling.
43
In short, we have strong reasons to believe that legislatures do not
suffer from the kind of instability or unpredictability suggested by some
aspects of public choice theory.44 But these findings do not entirely dis-
pel the normative anxiety expressed by Mashaw and others. Perhaps leg-
islatures are not chaotic, but they may still be normatively arbitrary. If
structural features such as agenda rules rather than majority preferences
determine outcomes, what becomes of the normative case for democracy?
Knowing that outcomes are predictable and stable is of little comfort if
they are also unconnected with anything that can plausibly be called the
popular will or the public interest.
40. For a general discussion of such "fair division" games, see M. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 306-11 (1982).
41. In technical terms, this game has no "core." See Wiley, Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 556, 559-61 (1987).
42. See M. SHUBIK, supra note 40, at 183-84; see also id. at 179-80, 413 (noting relevance of
value solution to fair division games).
43. Such norms should emerge even more strongly in voting situations that already have a
certain stability, such as those with institutionally induced equilibria or reasonably small uncovered
sets. The incentive to move away from these "natural" equilibria is small, because the ensuing cy-
cling is likely to send the outcome back into the equilibrium area anyway. Rational behavior calls
for quickly finding and sticking with the equilibrium area. We can assume that successful institu-
tions will have such norms, thus reinforcing any tendency toward equilibrium that is already present.
The norms need not, of course, be explicit, but may well be based on implicit understandings and
sanctions, which are especially likely to arise in situations like legislatures, where participants have
long-term, on-going interactions. It may also be possible to devise procedural rules that guarantee
this result. For instance, in the cake-cutting example, the person cutting the cake can be required to
take the last piece. For a recent summary of the relevant literature, see Axelrod & Dion, The Fur-
ther Evolution of Cooperation, 242 SC. 1385 (1988).
44. Indeed, "natural selection" would eliminate any legislature that failed to develop defenses
to cycling and instability. What purpose is served by a legislature whose outcomes are entirely
unpredictable and fortuitous? One might as well have legislation chosen at random from lists of
proposals. Obviously, a totally unstable legislature cannot further any version of the public good,
nor can it reliably advance the welfare of any interest group. Nor can it even further the self-interest
of the legislators themselves; because the outcome of the legislative process is fortuitous, no one has
any incentive to reward individual legislators.
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III. ARE LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES ARBITRARY?
At present, our understanding of the stabilizing features of legisla-
tures is still primitive. Any effort to assess the normative implications of
those features must be tentative. It is not too early, however, to attempt
at least an initial assessment of the normative issues. In the remainder of
this paper, I will sketch the possible outlines of a normative appraisal of
these stabilizing features.
One of the basic rules of legislative procedure is that any proposal
must win a majority vote when paired against the status quo. This helps
induce stability by limiting the set of possible outcomes. It also makes
good normative sense: clearly, the legislature should not adopt a mea-
sure which a majority finds less desirable than the status quo.
Stability can also be increased by restricting votes to a single dimen-
sion of dispute. This can be done through a "single subject" rule, by
requiring bills to fit within the jurisdiction of specialized committees, or
by a germaneness rule for amendments. Essentially, each of these de-
vices seeks to ensure a sort of rationality. A vote on two unrelated issues
(say abortion funding and arms control) leads to irrational results be-
cause preferences about abortion funding have no relevance to arms
control.
Single-dimensionality operates most strongly as a source of coher-
ence when preferences are uni-peaked - for example, when a legislator's
preferences are determined by her location on a liberal-to-conservative
ideological scale. The strong republican conception of community re-
quires that everyone share a single set of preferences. Uni-peakedness
can be seen as a weaker, but in some ways more realistic, form of com-
munity. People may disagree strongly about outcomes, but they share a
common cultural perspective which makes their disagreements coherent
and understandable to each other. Single-peakedness makes it possible
for people to locate their own positions with respect to those of others, to
identify the source of disputes, and to reach coherent and consistent
decisions.
Another structural stabilizer is the use of committees as gatekeepers.
Again, this device has at least some normative appeal. Committees may
develop useful specialized knowledge, which may increase the social
value of legislation, and they also offer an opportunity for group delibera-
tion that may be unmanageable on the floor of the legislature. Either on
the floor or in committee, deliberation may also provide an opportunity
for changes in preferences; not, presumably, by revamping basic individ-
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ual values, but by providing additional information about how to imple-
ment those values most effectively.
Moreover, committees may also give some degree of veto power to
the constituencies most vitally affected by certain legislation, giving them
a form of insurance against adverse government actions. Suppose that
most individuals have a single vital interest that could be impaired by
legislation. The committee system has two effects on them. If they con-
trol the relevant committee, they can veto legislation that affects this cru-
cial interest. On the other hand, other committees will veto legislation
that might benefit that particular group, depriving the group of possible
gains. If individuals are risk averse, they may find this an attractive
tradeoff.
45
The norm of fair division, which also supports stability, has obvious
ethical underpinnings. In part, it functions to limit the extent to which
losses are disproportionately imposed on subgroups. Like the committee
system, this has an insurance-like aspect. In some contexts, it may also
reflect more fundamental ethical concerns. The concept of fair division
has an evident egalitarian tinge. It can also reinforce concepts of com-
munity, by functioning as an acknowledgement of mutual concern and
respect.
These devices46 are not, of course, wholly beneficent in effect. Each
device has potential side effects. Committees can give special interests
the power to manipulate agendas or kill beneficial legislation. Ideology
can take the place of thought or turn into fanaticism.47 Issue-by-issue
voting on expenditures can lead to budget deficits, since those favoring
individual programs are not forced to set priorities. Compromise based
on norms of fair division can erode principled commitments. Neverthe-
less, despite the possibilities of abuse, these stability enhancing devices
have important normative virtues. They are not merely arbitrary meth-
45. The normative benefits and risks of the committee system are explored in Shepsle, Repre-
sentation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-off, 103 Pot. Scd. Q. 461 (1988).
46. Two other sources of stability should also be mentioned. First, the range of possible out-
comes can be sharply limited by strategic voting. See P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 23, at 266-81.
Strategic voting means that voters look ahead on the agenda, frustrating the efforts of agenda setters
to manipulate outcomes. This intelligent action by voters can prevent perverse outcomes in which
voters would be led to undesired results. This seems to increase the rationality of the process. Sec-
ond, Arrow's Theorem requires three or more alternatives, and can be avoided if voters are
presented with only two alternatives, as the two party system essentially insures. See K. ARROW.
SOCIAl CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAl. VALUEs 48-60 (2d ed. 1963). Depending on how these alterna-
tive packages of policies are assembled, the result again can be an increase in the fairness and ration-
ality of the process.
47. Rose-Ackerman, Public Policy in the Public Interest (Book Review), 6 YAt_E L. & Pot..
REV. 505, 512 (1988).
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ods for avoiding cycling and instability. Rather, they are in themselves
potentially desirable decisionmaking procedures.
Public choice theory thus has an ironic connection with republican-
ism. At first sight, the two seem irreconcilable: one seemingly based on
a glumly pessimistic appraisal of politics while the other sometimes
seems nearly utopian in its aspiration for the political process. But re-
publicanism at its most basic is a protest against the view that the polit-
ical process is a purely passive reflection of preexisting preferences. 4
Public choice theory supports republicanism on this point, because arbi-
trary preferences in themselves are likely to be insufficient to generate
coherent social choices.49 Rather, preferences have to be processed
through the legislative machinery, applying norms such as fairness and
using committees and other stability-enhancing devices. Choice is con-
siderably expedited if there is sufficient cultural consensus to generate
uni-peaked preferences along single dimensions of dispute. By under-
mining pluralism, social choice provides support for at least a weak form
of republicanism in which government is seen as not merely passive but
instead as actively processing existing preferences.
In the work that originally gave rise to modern social choice the-
ory, 50 Arrow's concern was less with the political process than with how
to measure social welfare. 5 1 His finding was that, in general, there is no
acceptable method for combining individual preferences into a unified
societal preference. Thus, in some sense, the "public interest" cannot be
an existing entity which is simply out there to be found, at least to the
extent the public interest is taken as the cumulative product of individual
preferences. Such a value-neutral, nonpolitical definition of the public
interest quite possibly does not exist. The legislature may also lack the
ability to identify transcendent values through deliberation of the kind
envisioned by some republicans. Nevertheless, legislation may still have
a valid claim of representing the public interest when the decisionmaking
techniques meet certain standards of fairness and stability. A legislative
decision might properly be said to represent the public interest when in-
dividual preferences on particular issues themselves generally fall into
coherent ideological patterns; when decisions are made using techniques
48. See Sunstein, LegalInterference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131-38,
1153-54 (1986).
49. See Frohock, Rationality, Morality. and Impossibility Theorems, 74 AM. POL. Scl. REV.
373, 382-83 (1980).
50. K. ARROW, supra note 46.
51. For an argument that the Arrow Theorem is only relevant to measurements of social wel-
fare, as opposed to political choice, see Kadish. Practice and Paradox: A Commet on Social Choice
Theory, 93 ErHics 680, 691-94 (1983).
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that embody society's understandings about relevance; when norms of
fair division are respected; and when the end result is preferred by a ma-
jority to the status quo.5 2 In short, perhaps we should not think of the
public interest as something that the political process merely identifies.
Rather, it might be useful to consider the public interest as being in some
sense created as the political process goes to work on processing existing
preferences.
The realities of the political process may sometimes realize the vices
of these stability features rather than their virtues. On those occasions,
the legislative process has less of a claim to represent the public interest.
But where the process operates properly, the resulting outcome has a
good claim to represent "society's judgment" - not a mechanical combi-
nation of individual preferences of the kind Arrow showed to be a phan-
tom, but rather a judgment created by and through the decisionmaking
process. Thus, when we say that legislation is in the "public interest," we
appear to be describing an inherent quality of the legislation, but perhaps
we are better understood as meaning that the legislation has been or
should be adopted in the context of a properly functioning legislative
process, given existing preferences as a starting point.
This does not mean, however, that a well-structured process guaran-
tees good legislation. Like Professor Mashaw, I believe that practical
reason must play an important role in the judicial process, 53 but its role is
no less crucial in the legislative process. Well-designed institutions, like
adjudicatory due process, can provide a setting in which intelligent, prin-
cipled decisions can be made. In part, legislative structures, like trial
procedures, make good decisions possible by narrowing the context of
the decision. Out of all the possible mixes of social policy, only a few are
presented to the legislator for a vote, providing a structure in which
political discourse can proceed. But the best conceivable set of legislative
procedures could not dictate results any more than the best trial proce-
dures can guarantee justice. The ultimate responsibility for the quality of
the decisions belongs to the participants-lawyers and judges in adjudi-
cation, legislators and citizens in legislation. Because the legislative
structure allows but does not guarantee desirable outcomes, there are no
substitutes for good judgment and political leadership.
This perspective cannot obviate Arrow's theorem. The results of the
52. As Michael Fitts points out, attempts by courts to enforce these standards may be ineffec-
tive or even counter-productive. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic
Virtue Reforms of the Political Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1625-42 (1988).
53. Sec Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. RiV. 1615
(1987); Mashaw. supra note 2. at 160.
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political process cannot satisfy all of his postulates (transitivity, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, etc.), simply because no decision method
can do so. But if we were to think of politics as an active reworking of
the existing situation, these postulates might seem less compelling. Ar-
row's postulates concern the relationship between the input and output
of social decisions. Since we can never fashion a procedure that will fit
his postulates, there may be little point in judging decisionmaking
processes by this standard: they all flunk. Our standards might do better
to look within the legislative black-box to inquire into the quality of
political procedures.
54
I do not want to argue, of course, that chaos and arbitrariness never
emerge in actual deliberative bodies. No one who has attended law
school faculty meetings can doubt the reality of this possibility. I would
argue, however, that on the whole legislatures are likely as a result of
natural selection to reach coherent outcomes that are related in some
reasonable way to legislators' preferences. In areas where the legislature
seems to dither or reach random results, there is less incentive to invoke
the legislative process. Such issues are more likely to be left to other
institutions such as the executive branch, the courts, or the market. In
areas where agenda setters use their power to reach results that are sys-
tematically opposed to the preferences of the legislators, they are more
likely to face challenges to their power. Consequently, there may be
some tendency for legislative action to take place in areas where (a) there
are coherent preferences, and (b) those preferences strongly influence re-
sults. In the law school setting, then, the Dean is likely to take control
on those issues where there is no coherent. faculty majority, while in
those areas where such a majority exists, the Dean will have only a lim-
ited (but still real) power to use agenda manipulation to thwart that ma-
jority. I leave any empirical judgment about these propositions to the
reader.
In closing, I would like to avoid two possible interpretations of my
comments. First, because I have been critical of some public choice
scholarship, the reader might conclude (as some actually have in the
past) that I am an "opponent" of public choice. My own view, however,
is that while public choice methodology requires careful handling, it is
potentially very useful. Second, although I argue that civic virtue and
legislative deliberation do play some role in the political process, I am
54. Nozick has proposed that we should judge the fairness of an existing wealth distribution by
the fairness of the process by which it evolved, rather than on its intrinsic ethical appeal. R.
NozICK, ANARCHY, STATFE AND UTOPIA 153-55 (1974). Perhaps we should at least in part assess
the validity of political outcomes on the basis of process rather than substance.
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not naively optimistic about the extent of that role. But if we throw up
our hands in disgust at the flaws of the political process, we are unlikely
to improve matters.
